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Feminist Engagement with Law in the New Millennium 
 
Abstract 
The works presented for the PhD by publication are all connected by a 
commitment to using law and human rights for feminist ends. They are 
located within the feminist discourse on the utility of law and human rights, 
and stress the inherent connection between feminist theory and activism. 
They counsel against a turning away from law, as suggested by some 
feminists, and instead set about explaining how existing legal structures and 
concepts can be made more responsive to women’s lived realities. 
The thesis demonstrates that law is an important site of power and public 
discourse where feminism in all its forms needs to have a presence. Several 
of the publications address feminist challenges to human rights, but advocate 
feminist participation in the political and legal processes that provide for the 
development, adoption and enforcement of universal norms. Using examples 
from the past and present the published works show that feminism is a force 
that has the capacity to interrupt and to intervene in law and human rights 
mechanisms. It has the potential to create, adapt and subvert legal principles 














	   4	  
Feminist Engagement with Law in the New Millennium 
 
 
Table of Contents 
 
 
1. 0 General Introduction 
 
1.1 Research Methods 
 
1. 2 Introduction to Feminisms 
 
1. 3 Feminism and Strategic Essentialism 
 
2. 0 Feminism and the Utility of Law 
 
2. 1 Harnessing Law’s Power 
 
3. 0 Feminism and Rights 
 
3.1 Feminist Critiques of Human Rights 
 
3.2 Feminist Engagement with Human Rights 
 
3.3 Feminism and Human Rights Iterations 
 
























	   5	  
 
 
Feminist Engagement with Law in the New Millennium 
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1.0 General Introduction 
Feminists have always had an ambivalent relationship with law and human 
rights.  This is reflected in the rich and diverse scholarship produced by legal 
feminists. Some scholars regard the achievements of legal feminism as 
‘substantial and cumulative’.1Others caution against an over reliance on law 
warning against complicity, and of exaggerating law’s power.2 My thesis is 
mindful of the feminist critique of liberalism, and the problematic nature of 
political and legal categories such as rights, equality and of the limits of law 
more generally.3 But nevertheless it maintains that legal principles, methods 
and concepts are susceptible to feminist influence. Using examples from the 
past and present it shows that feminism is a force that has the potential to 
interrupt and to intervene in law. It has the capacity to create, adapt and 
subvert legal principles through dialogic and feminist legal methods. The 
thesis demonstrates that law is one of a number of sites of power and public 
discourse where feminism in all its forms needs to have a presence. The 
published works presented for the PhD by publication are located within the 
feminist discourse on the utility of law and human rights. They focus on 
feminist legal theory and method, but draw more broadly on feminist theory 
when appropriate. They also emphasize the inherent connection between 
feminist theory and activism. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Ngaire Naffine, ‘In Praise of Legal Feminism’ (2002) 22 Legal Studies 71 2	  Carol Smart, Feminism and the Power of Law, (Routledge 1989), Wendy Brown and Janet 
Halley, ‘Introduction’, in Wendy Brown and Janet Halley (eds), Left Legalism/Left Critique 
(Duke University Press 2002), Aileen McColgan, Women Under the Law: The False Promise 
of Human Rights, (Longman 1999) 3	  Wendy Brown, States of Injury: Power and Freedom in Late Modernity (Princeton University 
Press 1995), Smart (n 2) 
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The nexus between feminism and human rights is a central pre-occupation of 
the thesis on at least two levels.  On the first level the work maintains an 
interest in international human rights, and considers their potential to push 
forward particular agendas.  On the second level it engages very specifically 
with human rights and domestic jurisprudence. It attempts to demonstrate that 
legal doctrines and processes are potentially, sufficiently pliable to be 
deployed in ways that are productive for feminists, and that on occasion the 
courts have, perhaps unwittingly, used feminist method to decide cases.4 It 
addresses many of the criticisms of human rights from within feminist theory.5 
But rather than rejecting human rights it urges feminists to reconstruct or 
reform rights instead of abandoning such a powerful discourse.  It supports 
the adoption of a dialogic approach to rights that produces an interactive 
universalism.6 It understands rights as iterations that are the subject of an 
ongoing conversation.7  Feminists need to join this conversation to influence 
the way in which rights are defined and deployed. 
 
1.1 Various different research methods have been adopted in the course of 
my writing and research. The majority of the works have used documentary 
analysis and traditional legal methods, which as Webley notes, are a form of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  See Judicial Deference and Feminist Method 2014 1	  5	  Ratna Kapur, Erotic Justice and the New Politics of Colonialism, (Glasshouse Press 2005), 
Diane Otto, ‘“Disconcerting “Masculinities”: Reinventing the Gendered Subject(s) of 
International Human Rights Law’ in Doris Buss and Ambreena Manji (eds), International law: 
Modern Feminist Approaches (Hart 2005) and Shereen Razak, ‘Domestic Violence as 
Gender Persecution: Policing the Borders of Nation, Race and Gender’ (1995) 8 Canadian 
Journal of Women and Law 45 6	  Seyla Benhabib, ‘The Legitimacy of Human Rights’ (2008) Daedalus, 94, and Siobhan 
Mullally, Gender, Culture and Human Rights: Reclaiming Universalism, (Hart 2006) 7	  Seyla Benhabib, ‘Democratic Iterations: The Local, The National and the Global’ in Robert 
Post (ed), Another Cosmopolitanism (OUP 2006) 
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qualitative research.8 This has involved studying case law, legislation, policy 
documents, scholarly works and other secondary materials. Some articles 
have involved archival research and examination of documents at the Public 
Records Office, Tower Hamlets Archive, the House of Lords and the Anti 
Slavery League. Several of the articles involved interviews with activists and 
lawyers about their experiences of legal and human rights processes. The 
process of re-writing a judgment as part of the feminist judgment project 
provided an opportunity to experiment with new methods of interrogating law. 
Using a judicial method of thinking and writing enabled me to understand the 
possibilities and constraints of adjudication, and gain insight into how a judge 
might experience law delivering in turn a more informed understanding of how 
feminist theory might best contribute to this adjudicative process.9 
 
1.2 Introduction to Feminisms 
This section reflects on the different types of feminism that are relied on in my 
thesis. It discusses the centrality of the relationship between feminist activism 
and the academy. It notes the contradiction between the views that feminism 
is too weak and divided to make a difference, that it is irrelevant and that it 
has become overly powerful. It discusses Halley’s well-known intervention 
that there is a need to ‘take a break’ from feminism to gain fresh 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  Lisa Webley, ‘Qualitative Approaches to Empirical Legal Research’ in Peter Cane and 
Herbert M. Kritzer (eds) The Oxford Handbook of Empirical Legal Research (Oxford 
University Press 2010) 927-950, 927	  9	  Rosemary Hunter, Clare McGlynn, and Erica Rackley (eds) Feminist Judgments: From 
Theory to Practice, (Hart 2010) 
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perspectives.10 It rejects this suggestion on the grounds that feminism has 
repeatedly shown itself to be open to new ways of thinking. 
 
There is no authoritative definition of feminism, but there are a set of distinct 
ideas. These include a pre-eminent commitment to exposing and bringing to 
an end women’s exclusion from various spheres in society and its 
institutions.11 Feminism is a practical movement that seeks through theory, 
politics, culture, law and other means to expunge gendered practices. It sets 
out to imagine and recreate a world without gender hierarchy. 12  Legal 
feminists seek to interrogate, explore and deploy law in this broader project. 
 
There are profound differences between feminists exemplified by their loose 
categorization into the well-known schools of thought.13 These disputes 
include interrogating whether the category of ‘woman’ exists and whether 
women have an ‘essential’ nature.14 These different strands of feminist theory 
have influenced my work, but I do not champion any particular one. In 
Feminist Legal Theory 2013, where I give an overall account of the subject, I 
adopt a thematic approach that discusses feminism in terms of its key 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  Janet Halley, Split Decisions: How and Why to Take a Break from Feminism (Princeton 
University Press 2006)  11	  Denise G. Reaume, ‘What is Distinctive about Feminist Analysis’ (1986) 2 Legal Theory 
265	  12	  I	  am drawing here on the many definitions of feminism including those from	  Vanessa 
Munro,	  Law and Politics at the Perimeter: Re-Evaluating Key Debates in Feminist Theory, 
(Hart 2007) 11, Ngaire Naffine,  ‘In Praise of Legal Feminism’ (n 1) and Joanne Conaghan, 
‘Reassessing the Feminist Theoretical Project in Law’ (2000) 27 Journal of Law and Society 
351 13	  For an accounts of the various schools of feminist thought see Patricia A. Cain, ‘Feminism 
and the Limits of Equality’ (1990) 24 Georgia Law Review 803, Rosemarie Tong, Feminist 
Thought: A Comprehensive Introduction, (Routledge1994) and Maggie Humm, Feminisms: A 
Reader (Harvester Wheatsheaf 1992) 14	  Judith Butler,	  Gender Trouble (Routledge 2007)	  These issues are both addressed further 
at 1.3 
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conceptual critiques namely public/private and equality, and look at the 
different contributions made from the disparate schools. My use of theories of 
rights, equality and autonomy provides a clear connection with liberal 
feminism. However, my articles on sexual harassment look at several theories 
including the radical feminism of MacKinnon, and her dominance thesis.15 
Although I would agree with most other commentators that MacKinnon has 
not sufficiently problematized the category of woman I think her work is an 
important reference point in legal feminism.16 My writing on feminist legal 
method often draws on some of the more relational theoretical approaches 
derived from cultural feminism.17 I explore how these ideas might be used to 
develop alternative legal modalities.18 But I would reject the idea that women 
have a fixed and enduring nature. Post-modern feminism is referenced 
throughout as a method of critique to expose the limits of law and to 
reconstruct the subject. Its theories are robust in holding law and feminism to 
account, but it is often less useful in proposing alternatives to the current 
frame.  My use of any particular theory depends on its utility and its 
contribution to the feminist legal project. This approach also informs my use of 
human rights theory discussed below. As Bottomley and Conaghan state this 
means that ‘…the strength of feminist jurisprudence is tested not by claims to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  Catherine A MacKinnon, Towards a Feminist Theory of the State (Harvard University Press 
1989)	  16	  For criticisms of MacKinnon’s essentialism see Wendy Brown, States of Injury: Power and 
Freedom in Late Modernity (n3) and Angela Harris, ‘Race and Essentialism’ in Feminist 
Theory’ in Adriene K. Wing (ed) Critical Race Feminism: A Reader (New York University 
Press, 1997) 11-18, 13 
 For a defence of MacKinnon’s views see Ann Scales, Legal Feminism: Activism, Lawyering 
and Legal Theory, (New York University Press 2006) 13. The feminist debate on essentialism 
is discussed at 1.3 below 17	  	  Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice, (Harvard University Press 1982) and Robyn West, 
‘Jurisprudence and Gender’ (1988) University of Chicago Law Review 1 18	  Feminizing Human Rights Adjudication 2013 and Judicial Deference and Method 2014 
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internal coherence but rather by an ability to deliver.’19 I would add that it is 
the potential to yield results that is crucial. This is consistent with my theme 
that legal feminism is a practical project and it has a responsibility to try to 
shape law and its adjudicatory processes. 
 
My work is underpinned by an understanding of the value of feminism, in its 
various forms, as a force for change. This puts me at odds with Halley’s 
exhortation to, ‘take a break from feminism’. Halley sees feminism as stifling 
other new and innovative modes of thinking by its relentless focus on what 
she describes as m>f, and carrying a brief for f.20 Halley argues that feminism 
is obsessed with women’s subordination and victimization. It exercises real 
power and has morphed into ‘governance feminism’ that ‘walks the halls of 
power’, is a force to be contended with in the culture wars and its views on 
sexual harassment and rape have become ubiquitous.21 According to Halley 
feminists who rely on post-modern or post-colonial ideas are diverging and 
suspending their feminist impulses in order to pursue different avenues of 
thought.22 Halley severely underestimates the extent to which feminism 
enthusiastically adopts other ideologies and disciplines as exemplified by the 
various schools of thought that draw, inter alia, on socialism, psychology and 
post structuralism. Feminist legal scholars have also relied, for instance, on 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  Anne Bottomley and Joanne Conaghan, Feminist Theory and Legal Strategy (Blackwell 
1993) 1 20	  Halley (n 10) 17. Halley states that for a theory to be feminist there are three elements. 
First, there must be a distinction between m and f. Second, there must be some sort of 
subordination between m and f. Thirdly, there must be opposition to the subordination of f. 
Halley (n 10) 18 21	  Halley (n10 ) 20-22	  22	  Halley (n10) 19-20 
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critical legal studies and legal realism.23  It is feminism’s openness, absorption 
of other ideas and its willingness to adapt that leads me to reject Halley’s 
exhortation that it is necessary to ‘take a break from feminism’ to obtain fresh 
perspectives. There have always been lively debates within feminism about 
the dangers of the over regulation of sexual conduct, and the need to pay 
attention to a diversity of interests including those of heterosexual men.24 Her 
work seems to pay insufficient attention to lived realities, and as Cooper has 
noted, ‘[o]n one level social change politics seems almost completely absent 
from Split Decisions’.25 Taking a break from feminism would come at too high 
a cost at a time when the political and legal environment requires that 
attention be paid to gender hierarchies.  
 
The premise of my thesis is that feminism needs to work with the existing 
legal and political structures whilst imagining alternatives. It is not the powerful 
force, visualized by Halley, nor is it disempowered or irrelevant. Feminism, as 
discussed below, has been successful in removing formal legal barriers, and 
influencing national and international political agendas. It does sometimes 
‘walk the corridors of power’. Governments and international organizations 
have created institutions that have gone some way to embed feminism in the 
state through the creation of a feminist architecture.26 This carries the risk of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  Ngaire Naffine ‘In Praise of Legal Feminism’ (n 1) 80 24	  Lynne Segal, ‘Comments on Split Decisions: How and Why to Take a Break from 
Feminism’ (2010) International Journal of Law in Context 112 and Ngaire Naffine, Gender and 
Justice (Ashgate, 2002) 1 25	  Davina Cooper, ‘The Pain and Power of Sexual Interests: responding to Split Decisions’ 
(2010) International Journal of Law in Context 94, 97. See also Joanne Conaghan ‘Feminist 
Legal Studies: General Introduction’ in Feminist Legal Studies, (Routledge 2009) 10 26	  Sylvia Walby, The Future of Feminism (Polity 2011) 58-61. See generally on state 
feminism	  Vicky Randall and Georgina Waylen (eds), Gender, Politics and the State 
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feminism losing its independence and critical edge and of being 
instrumentalised.27  It means that feminism takes place within and outside the 
state, and that at times it has to struggle to maintain its own priorities in the 
face of competing state discourses.28 But there is little evidence to suggest 
that it has morphed into the overly powerful ‘governance’ feminism that Halley 
describes. The numbers of women in positions of power and authority still 
remains stubbornly low, and hard won gains are vulnerable to policy shifts.29  
However, I would also reject the idea that feminism has become irrelevant or 
is the weak, washed out or weary force described by others. 30Feminism does 
have a presence in the legal and political sphere that enables it to contribute 
to the ongoing conversations about gender. It is informed by its activism within 
and without the state, but it is submitted here that it maintains its basic 
theoretical and political shape.  
 
Feminism’s heterogeneity should, in general, be seen as a strength rather 
than a weakness.31 In terms of scholarship the difference between feminist 
theories is seen here as a set of rich resources on which to draw rather than 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
(Routledge 2002) and Joyce Outshoorn and Johanna Kantola, (eds) Changing State 
Feminism (Palgrave Macmillan 2007)	  27	  Angela McRobbie, The Aftermath of Feminism: Gender, Culture and Social Change (Sage 
2009). These issues are pursued in brief at 2.00 28	  See below at 2.0	  29	  For the numbers of women in positions of power and authority in the United Kingdom see 
Fawcett Society,	  Sex and Power 2013: Who Runs Britain, 2013, 
http://www.fawcettsociety.org.uk/sex-and-power-2013-who-runs-britain/ (last accessed 
January 28th 2014).  See also Joni Lovenduki, ‘Feminizing British Politics’ (2012) The Political 
Quarterly 697 30	  It has been argued that there has been a feminist resurgence that is evidenced by the 
activity on the internet, protests, university activity, membership groups, UK networking 
groups and individual activism.  Catherine Redfern, and Kristin Aune, Reclaiming the F Word, 
(Zed Books 2010). See also Ealasaid Munro, ‘Feminism: A Fourth Wave?’ (2013) Political 
Insight 22 31	  Redfern and Aune	  Ibid 2	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an encumbrance.32 It is also important not to overplay the differences 
between feminist scholars who are often supportive of similar policy 
recommendations.33 Activists navigate difference through working in coalitions 
and networks. These provide pathways through which feminist ideas and 
methods enter the mainstream.34 Much of my work is directed at suggesting 
how feminist scholarship and activism can find a route into the legal process. 
Feminist Activism and Third Party Interventions 2005, for example, explores 
feminist legal activism in the UK. It notes that litigation strategies have never 
been as organized and targeted as in North America, but there has been a 
steady stream of activity that has focused on law reform and strategic 
litigation.35 The article examines the use of third party interventions after the 
introduction of the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA) as a means of influencing 
judicial decisions and the developing human rights jurisprudence. This work is 
rooted in the assumption that there is a dynamic and fluid body of ideas that 
emanates from feminist groups and scholars that should be pursued. My 
writing on human rights draws on the international human rights principles 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32	  This approach was taken in the Feminist Judgments Project, which relied on various 
strands of feminism. Rosemary Hunter, Clare McGlynn and Erica Rackley (n 9) Edwards in 
her analysis of feminism and international human rights also states that she prefers not to rely 
on any particular strand of feminism. She finds it more helpful to use the various perspectives 
as tools of analysis. Alice Edwards, Violence Against Women Under International Human 
Rights Law, (Cambridge University Press, 2010) 38 
33	  Ann Phillips, ‘Feminism and the Politics of Difference. Or, Where have all the Women 
Gone?’ in Susan James and Stephanie Palmer (eds), Visible Women: Essays in Feminist 
Legal Theory and Political Philosophy (Hart, 2002) 11–28, 13 34	  Sylvia Walby (n 26) 61-63 35	  For a recent discussion of feminist legal activism in the United Kingdom see Susan Millns 
and Charlotte Skeet, ‘Gender Equality and Legal Mobilisation in the United Kingdom: Using 
Rights for Lobbying, Litigation, Defence and Attack’ (2013) 28 Canadian Journal of Law and 
Society 169 
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developed by transnational and domestic women’s groups.36 It pre-supposes 
that that there is a sufficiently coherent set of norms that can be translated 
into legal principles. Where feminist ideas conflict, and there are different sets 
of solution to a legal problem, Gotell argues that the feminist response should 
be to present the court with multiple interventions. She suggests that this 
makes it clear that legal arguments are the subject of political positions. She 
acknowledges the risks but also sees that it presents possibilities for 
feminists.37 Rather than see feminist difference as a disadvantage it can 
provide the basis for a judicial decision based on a full knowledge of the 
underlying controversy.38 
 
In sum, my work adopts a broad definition of feminism that sees it as a set of 
sometimes conflicting ideas that continues to have purchase. It holds open 
the prospect that feminism can gain legal traction, and can at a minimum 
bring the lived reality of people’s lives to law’s centre. It sees feminism as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  36	  Some of my earlier work also explores the use of international human rights norms by non 
government organisations. See Carole Petersen and Harriet Samuels, ‘The International 
Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women: A Comparison 
of its Implementation and the Role of Non-Governmental Organizations in the United 
Kingdom and Hong Kong’ (2002) 26 Hastings International and Comparative Law Review 1-
50 37	  Lise Gotell, ‘LEAF’s Changing Approach to Charter Equality’ in Radha Jhappan (ed.) 
Women’s Legal Strategies Canada (University of Toronto Press 2002) 135-174,164 38	  This was the position in Quila. Here the court had to decide on the legality of the 
government’s amendments to the Immigration Regulations on mixed nationality marriages. 
The government introduced the changes in order to deter forced marriage. Southall Black 
Sisters intervened to argue against the amendments whereas another women’s group, Karma 
Nirvana, intervened in favour of the government view. The Supreme Court decided against 
the government on the grounds that the changes to the Immigration Regulations were 
disproportionate and breached the right to a family life in Article 8 of the Convention. See R 
(Aguilar Quila and another) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] UKSC 45. 
This case is discussed in Judicial Deference and Feminist Method 2014 
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being able to infuse law with some of its priorities and encourages the use of 
legally orientated solutions.  
 
1.3 Feminism and Strategic Essentialism 
My thesis that feminists should have an active presence within the legal arena 
is potentially undermined by the essentialist critique, which questions whether 
there is sufficient commonality between women for them to be a credible 
constituency. This critique has been described as a ‘particular bane for 
feminist jurisprudence’.39 And before I proceed it is necessary to explain how I 
reconcile the essentialist critique with my commitment to feminist mobilization 
around law. 
 
The essentialist critique, originally associated with critical race theory, takes 
feminists to task for imposing a category of woman with a fixed or essential 
nature, which fails to capture the diversity of the human experience, and 
underplays differences based on race, class and other categories.40  Post-
modernists have also been instrumental in this analysis, and the consequence 
has been to destabilise the female subject.41 For many postmodern feminists 
the category of woman is regarded as defunct, and gender is seen as 
performative. The subject is dissolved, and politics is conducted by making 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  39	  Jill Marshall, Humanity, Freedom and Feminism (Ashgate 2005) 76 40	  Combahee River Collection, ‘A black feminist statement’ in Zillah Eisenstein (ed), Capitalist 
Patriarchy and the Case for Socialist Feminism, (Monthly Press Review 1994) and Angela 
Harris,  ‘Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory’ in Adrien Katherine Wing (ed), 
Critical Race Feminism: A Reader (New York University Press 1997) 7-17 41	  Bordo has described this combination as an ‘academic marriage’ that has ‘brought 
indigenous feminist concerns over ethnocentrism and unconscious racial biases of gender 
theory into theoretical alliances with …poststructuralist thought’, Susan Bordo, ‘Feminism, 
Postmodernism and Gender Scepticism’ in Linda Nicholson (ed), Feminism/Postmodernism, 
(Routledge 1990) 133-156, 135	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gender trouble; existing gender categories are confused through subversive 
acts. 42 Conaghan, in her seminal essay, states that the essentialist critique 
poses two main problems. It threatens to rob feminism of women as an 
identifiable political constituency, and it makes it difficult for feminism to speak 
of women’s experiences without minimizing their diversity.43 
 
In An uneasy Alliance 2009 my premise, that maintaining the category of 
woman is vital for feminism, is made explicit. This is a short piece, which 
discusses the different but related issue of the relationship between the 
scholarship on feminist legal studies and gender, sexuality and law. It argues 
that dissolving the category of woman is to imply that feminism has run its 
course, and that it discounts the possibility, in particular contexts, that women 
may have interests distinct from others. Without adopting a totalizing view it is 
possible to see that there is sufficient evidence of commonality, in areas of the 
human experience, for women to form alliances.44 A failure to see women as 
a broad based group means that it is difficult to organize politically and, it is 
submitted that this is too great a loss for feminism which needs power and 
influence if it is to effect change.45  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  42	  Judith Butler (n 14) 35	  	  43	  Conaghan also notes that the feminist anxiety over essentialism has discouraged empirical 
legal research that has a socio economic focus in favour of abstract theorizing on the 
gendering of cultural and legal representations. See Joanne Conaghan, ‘Reassessing the 
Feminist Theoretical Project in Law’ (n 12) 370 44	  	  Joanne Conaghan, ‘Reassessing the Feminist Theoretical Project in Law’, (n 12) 373 Jill 
Marshall (n 39) 89 45	  Marshall argues that dissolving the subject without reconstructing it may lead to ‘chaos and 
meaninglessness’ leaving no basis to improve people’s lives. See Jill Marshall (n39) 83  
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Along with many other feminist scholars I support the use of strategic 
essentialism.46 This recognizes the danger of invoking woman as a stable 
character with a fixed identity. But as the category of woman is one that finds 
general acceptance in most societies it advocates relying on essentialism for 
achieving certain goals.  However, it requires the development of methods 
and strategies to minimize the risk of ignoring differences and ensuring 
greater inclusivity. The result is that feminist theory is able to interact with 
feminist practice and to remain rooted in the experiential realm. This must be 
read through Marshall’s critical insight that the methods needed to guard 
against the imposition of a dogmatic feminism are to be found in the 
deconstructive techniques of postmodernism.47 This ensures there is constant 
reflection and openness. It goes some way to providing a response to the 
critics of strategic essentialism who see it as a method of avoiding the 
challenges of identity politics, and of being excessively instrumental.48  
Sustained deliberation and contextualization mean that each use of 
essentialism, the motive of the actor and every legal strategy, must be 
scrutinized.49  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  46	  This term has its origins in the work of Spivak. See Gayatri Spivak  ‘Subaltern Studies: 
Deconstructing Historiography’ in Ranajit Guha and Gayatri Spivak, (eds), Selected Subaltern 
Studies, (Oxford University Press 1988) and Gayatri Spivak, with Ellen Rooney, 
‘In a Word: Interview with Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak with Ellen Rooney’ in Naomi Schor and 
Elizabeth Weed (eds), the essential difference, (Indiana University Press 1994) 98-115. 47	  Jill Marshall (n 39) 78 	  48	  Vanessa Munro (n 12) 117.	  Other reservations over the use of strategic essentialism are 
that it may become permanent and be used for reactionary means.	  See Diana Fuss, ‘Reading 
Like a Feminist’ in Naomi Schor and Elizabeth Weed, The Essential Difference (n 46) 107. 
See also the critique of Rosalind Dixon, (2008) ‘Feminist Disagreement (Comparatively) 
Recast’ (2008) 31 Harvard Journal of Law and Gender 277	  49	  Fuss observes that Spivak’s approach focuses on the motivation behind the use of 
essentialism, and she re-emphasises the need to scrutinise who is practicing it. See Diana 
Fuss, ‘Reading it Like a Feminist’ ibid 108	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2.0 Feminism and the Utility of Law 
This section situates my work in the context of the feminist debate on the 
utility of law, and in particular challenges Smart’s advice to feminists to 
abstain from litigation and law reform. It explains the background to Smart’s 
intervention as a critical response to the reliance on law by previous 
generations of feminists. It goes on to explain how some of the published 
pieces fit into this part of the thesis. It then dwells on the work done in Sexual 
Harassment: A Defining Moment 2004 to demonstrate how it foregrounds 
many of the issues developed in later work. 
 
My work makes the case for a feminist commitment to the use of law to 
progress feminist aims. It is not a rejection of existing critiques of liberalism 
and law, but a recognition of feminism’s capacity to use law for its own ends.50 
Most accounts of feminist engagement with law start with the call, by first 
wave feminists, for women to be treated as equals by the law.51 This centred 
on the demand for women to be recognized as legal persons, to enter the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  50	  	  An early analysis of women’s position within the liberal rights frame is provided, most 
famously, by Mary Wollstonecraft, A Vindication of the Rights of Women, (Penguin Books 
1982) and John Stuart Mill, On the Subjection of Women 1869 (Cambridge University Press 
1989). For more general feminist critiques of liberalism see Susan Molly Okin, Women in 
Western Political Thought, (Princeton University Press 1979), Carol Pateman, The Sexual 
Contract (Blackwell Publishers 1988) and Alison M. Jaggar, Feminist Politics and Human 
Nature (Rowman and Littlefeld Publishers 1988) 51	  For an alternative account that argues that Victorian feminists eschewed the language of 
equality see Rosemary Auchmuty, ‘The Married Women’s Property Acts’ in Rosemary Hunter 
(ed), Rethinking Equality: Feminist Challenges,  (Hart 2009) 13-39. Feminist activism is 
traditionally described in waves. The first wave was during the late 19th and early 20th century 
and the second wave was in the 1960’s and 1970’s. The third wave usually refers to the 
1990’s or the so-called ‘post feminist era’. Perhaps there is now a fourth wave of feminist 
activism beginning in 2010 given an apparent resurgence in visible feminist activity. See 
Catherine Redfern, and Kristin Aune (n 30) and Ealasaid Munro (n 30). Conaghan notes that 
the ‘wave typology’ does not always accurately reflect the location and timing of feminist 
work. For example events could be organized thematically and she notes that some feminists 
would deny there is a third feminist wave. Joanne Conaghan, Law and Gender (Oxford 
University Press 2003) 130 
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professions, and to be able to vote.52 The feminist judgment in Roberts v 
Hopwood 2010 makes reference to some of the relevant legal changes.53 The 
common law and the judiciary were either indifferent or hostile towards these 
initiatives.54 Second wave feminism, beginning approximately in the mid 
1960’s, moved from dismantling formal barriers to equality, to a focus on more 
substantive areas of law that had a particular impact on women such as 
domestic violence, rape, abortion and employment law.55 There was a 
historical shift from opposing blatantly discriminatory laws to using the law to 
end discrimination.56 This absorption of women into the liberal legal frame and 
the achievement of formal equality was gained by what Fredman describes as 
a ‘painfully slow and conflictual process’.57 This has resulted in the elimination 
of most formal barriers, but many issues of substantive inequality remain well 
into the twenty-first century. This is evidenced by, for instance, the high levels 
of violence against women, dissatisfaction with the law on rape, the gender 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  52	  For accounts and analysis of these events see Ray Strachey, The Cause: A Short History 
of the Women’s Movement in Great Britain (Virago 1978) and Albie Sachs and Joan Hoff 
Wilson, Sexism and the Law: A Study of Male Beliefs and Judicial Bias (Martin Robertson 
1978) 
53 These include the Representation of the People Act 1918, the Parliament (Qualification of 
Women) Act 1918 and the Sex Disqualification Removal Act 1918 54	  Sachs and Hoff Wilson (n 52) 
55	  Kathleen Bartlett, and Rosanne Kennedy, ‘Introduction’ in Kathleen Bartlett, and Rosanne 
Kennedy (eds), Feminist Legal Theory: Readings in Law and Gender, (Westview Press 
1991). For an overview of the state of the law in the United Kingdom in this period from a 
feminist perspective see Susan Atkins, and Brenda Hoggett, Women and Law, (Blackwell 
1981) 56	  Jaggar (n 50) 35. In the United Kingdom this manifested itself in the introduction of 
legislation such as the Sex Discrimination Act 1975, the Equal Pay Act 1970 and the 
Domestic Violence and Proceedings Act 1976 57	  Sandra Fredman, Women and the Law, (Clarendon Press 1997) 95	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pay gap, the disproportionate impact of austerity measures on women and 
discrimination on the grounds of pregnancy.58   
 
In addition to criticizing discriminatory laws and working on law reform there 
was a trend within legal feminism from the 1980’s onwards that interrogated 
the gendered nature of the legal discourse. Conaghan identifies three strands 
in this thinking.59 They are first, feminists who provide an analysis of how 
supposedly gender-neutral laws disadvantage women through their 
differential impact, secondly, those who examine how liberal ideas 
themselves, such as autonomy and privacy, exclude women and their 
concerns. Thirdly feminists have examined how law constructs images of 
women such as the ‘good’ mother and the ‘real’ rape victim.60 For radical 
feminist scholars such as MacKinnon the consequence of this type of analysis 
of law was to conclude that the law was male because it was written by men, 
it ignores women’s reality and embodies male power over women.61  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  58	  For examples of recent NGO, government reports and websites that discuss gender 
equality see The Fawcett Society, The Impact of Austerity on Women, March 2012 
http://www.fawcettsociety.org.uk/?attachment_id=407 (last accessed 28th January 2014), 
Home Office, The Stern Review: A Report by Baroness Stern CBE of an Independent Review 
into how Rape Complaints are Handled by Public Authorities in England and Wales, 2010 
2010http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20100418065537/equalities.gov.uk/stern_revi
ew.aspx (last accessed 28th January 2014), Home Office, Ending Violence Against Women 
and Girls, 2013, https://www.gov.uk/government/policies/ending-violence-against-women-
and-girls-in-the-uk/supporting-pages/domestic-violence (last accessed January 26th 2014) 59	  Joanne Conaghan, ‘Reassessing the Feminist Theoretical Project in Law’ (n 12) 360-61. 
See also Ngaire Naffine, Law and the Sexes: Explorations in Feminist Jurisprudence (Allen 
and Unwin 1990) especially chapter 1 60	  Ibid Conaghan 361 61	  Mackinnon states that, ‘In the liberal state, the rule of law-neutral, abstract, elevated, 
pervasive-both institutionalizes the power of men over women and institutionalizes power in 
its male form’. Catherine A. MacKinnon, Toward A Feminist Theory of the State (n 15) 238. 
Some of MacKinnon’s language feels dated because of her use and juxtaposition of the 
categories of male and female. As Conaghan notes feminist scholars have eschewed the ‘law 
is male’ analysis as it fails to acknowledge that masculinity is also constructed, and it is seen 
as essentialist and reductionist. Instead law is described as gendered. Conaghan Law and 
Gender ( 51) 75. However, much of MacKinnon’s reasoning is sound. Her point that law’s 
neutrality is a sham is one that is still supported by many feminists.  
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MacKinnon concludes that it is necessary to create a feminist jurisprudence to 
expose law’s maleness, to embody women’s experiences and to redress this 
male bias. For Smart this is to concede too much to law. Her seminal book 
Feminism and The Power of Law cautions feminists against excessive faith in 
law.62 Smart, influenced by Foucault, sees law as exercising power by 
claiming that it has the methods to establish truth and thus disqualifies other 
forms of knowledge and experience as inferior.63 Relying on Mossman, she 
declares that legal method is impervious to feminism.64 Smart disapproves of 
law reform and the attempts of scholars such as MacKinnon to develop a 
‘grand theory’ or feminist jurisprudence.65 She points out law’s shortcomings 
as a method of achieving change and warns that by using law feminists confer 
it with a special privilege in solving problems faced by women.66  She urges 
feminists to consider non-legal strategies.67 In her later work she criticizes, 
what she sees as a tendency for feminists to shy away from theorizing law in 
an attempt to retain law’s practical values.68 Sandland explains Smart’s 
refutation of law as follows, 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  62	  Smart (n 2) 10	  63	  Smart, as a postmodernist, is also critical of feminists for their belief in the possibility of 
truth. Drakopoulou, in response, points out that by recognizing something as untrue one must 
inevitably recognize something else as a ‘better truth’. See Maria Drakopoulou, 
‘Postmodernism and Smart’s Feminist Critical Project in Law, Crime and Sexuality’ (1997) 1 
Feminist Legal Studies 107, 113	  64	  Mary Jane Mossman, ‘Feminism and Legal Method: The Difference it Makes’ (1987) 3 
Wisconsin Journal of Law and Society 30 65	  Catherine MacKinnon, Towards a Feminist Theory of the State (n15) 
66	  This debate is also summarized and discussed in Harriet Samuels, 'Women and the Law in 
Hong Kong: A Feminist Analysis in Raymond Wacks (ed), China, Hong Kong and 1997: Essays 
in Legal Theory (Hong Kong University Press 1993) 67	  Carol Smart, The Power of Law (n 2) 164. And also Carol Smart, Law, Crime and 
Sexuality: Essays in Feminism, (Sage Publications 1995)	  68	  Carol Smart, ‘The Woman of Legal Discourse’ (1992) Social and Legal Studies 29, 30 
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‘When law is engaged with on its own terms so much is always already 
given that such engagement can only be counter-productive. From her 
point of view, for example, all cases are wrongly decided, and they 
would still be wrongly decided if the substantive outcome [had] been 
different, since all cases must fall to be decided within a given (legal) 
framework which fails to challenge the deployment of 
sex(uality)/gender-as-identity, on the one hand, and which legitimizes 
Law on the other.’69 
 
It is difficult to overestimate the importance of Smart’s book. 
It appears to have a very clear message and poured a bucket of very cold 
water over second wave feminists’ enthusiasm for trying to use law for 
women.70  This has led to a disjuncture between feminist theorising and 
practice, which is regretted by many feminists.71 It is my disquiet about this 
call to turn away from law, and the belief that legal feminists, both scholars 
and activists, have a responsibility to engage with law that underpins the 
thesis. Critique of law is insufficient. There is a need to use law’s tools in 
traditional and imaginative ways not only to expose its gendered character but 
to find new ways of doing law. This aligns the thesis alongside feminists who 
seek to reconstruct liberal values rather than reject them outright.72 Feminists 
have interrogated liberalism and found it wanting. They have critiqued the 
individualistic and autonomous nature of the liberal subject, the dualism that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  69	  Ralph Sandland, ‘Between “Truth” and “Difference”: Poststructuralism, Law and the Power 
of Feminism’ (1995) 3 Feminist Legal Studies 4,16 
70 Joanne Conaghan, ‘Reassessing the Feminist Theoretical Project in Law’ (n 12) 363. 
71 Joanne Conaghan ibid, 356 and Vanessa Munro (n 12 ) 69, Siobhan Mullally, (n 6) 223 72	  See, for example,	  Rosemary Hunter, Clare McGlynn, and Erica Rackley (n 9), Jill Marshall 
(n 39) Siobhan Mullally (6), and Vanessa Munro (12),  
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liberalism presents in its divisions between the rational versus the emotional, 
its formal view of equality, the vision of the neutral state and its separation of 
the public and the private realm. 73 Jaggar concludes that feminism has often 
relied on liberal ideas and has many reasons to be grateful to liberalism, but 
that it is incapable of bringing about the changes desired.74 Nussbaum, on the 
contrary, accepts much of the critique of liberalism, but she has famously 
mounted a spirited defence of its principles of ‘personhood, autonomy, rights 
dignity [and] self respect’.75  She has pointed out the diversity of liberal 
thinking, and notes that it has attempted to respond to feminist criticisms. She 
tries to persuade the reader that, ‘[t]he deepest and most central ideas of the 
liberal tradition are ideas of radical force and great theoretical and practical 
value’.76 Nussbaum’s own project, based on human capabilities, articulates a 
set of needs necessary for autonomy and human flourishing.77  
 
My concern that Smart’s exhortations to desist from legal engagement, are 
overly dismissive of law’s possibilities, are shared by other legal feminists and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 See Alison Jaggar (n 50 ) Susan Molly Okin (n 50), Carol Pateman (n 50). For legally 
focused critiques see, for example, Katherine O’Donovan, Sexual Divisions in the Law 
(Weidenfeld and Nicolson 1985), Ngaire Naffine, Law and the Sexes: Explorations in Feminist 
Jurisprudence (n 59), Nicola Lacey, Unspeakable Subjects: Feminist Essays in Legal and 
Social Theory (Hart, 1998) 74	  Alison	  Jaggar (n 50) 47	  
75 Martha C Nussbaum, Sex and Social Justice (Oxford University Press 1999) 56 
76 Ibid 56. For a critique of Nussbaum’s theory see Ann Phillips, ‘Feminism and Liberalism 
Revisited: Has Martha Nussbaum got it Right?’ (2001) 8 Constellations 249. Other feminists 
also make use of liberal ideas in their work. Notably, Cornell relies on the liberal values of  
equal worth and the capacity for self-determination. She marries this with psychoanalytic and 
postmodern theory to create the imaginary domain where individuals have the chance to 
become a person. See Drucilla Cornell, The Imaginary Domain (Routledge 1995). For a 
comparison of Cornell and Nussbaum see Karen Van Marle ‘”The Capabilities Approach”, 
“The Imaginary domain” and “Asymmetrical Reciprocity” Feminist Perspectives on Equality 
and Justice” ‘(2003) Feminist Legal Studies 255 
77 Martha C. Nussbaum ‘Human Capabilities, Female Human Beings’ in Martha.C. 
Nussbaum and Jonathan Glover (eds), Women, Culture and Development: A Study of Human 
Capability (Oxford University Press 1995) 60-104 
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critical theorists. Sandland criticizes Smart for creating a dichotomy between 
politics/philosophy and between deconstruction/reform thus closing down all 
political and legal options. 78 Being outside the system as a form of resistance 
is, according to Sandland, a strategy of ‘no resistance’. He sees Smart as 
being overly pessimistic, by dismissing the significance of cases such as R v 
R, where the judges removed the marital rape exemption, there is a danger of 
feminism ‘understating its own political and jurisprudential purchase as a 
subversive force interrupting the “unmodified” liberal paradigm’.79 Feminism 
needs to use the tension between recognition and denial of law to evaluate 
the merits of legal intervention on a case-by-case basis. Sandland sees there 
being value in finding the gaps in law that provide a space to struggle over 
law’s meaning.80Lacey appears sympathetic to Smart’s theoretical project, 
and to Smart’s insight that law’s belief that it is objective, true and impartial 
inflates its status so that it appear superior to other forms of knowledge. This 
makes it harmful to women.81 But she also has reservations about Smart’s 
political strategy and argues that it would be unfortunate to give up attempts 
at legal reform. She notes that it is unclear that other institutions such as the 
family, religion or politics are more susceptible to reconstruction than law.82 
Writing just under ten years later Munro argues that feminism should not 
relinquish its attempts to reconstruct law. She is not uncritical of liberal values, 
but given law’s resistance to competing discourses she thinks there are 
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pragmatic reasons for using law rather than remaining silenced by an 
oppositional stance.83  
 
My view is that feminist strategy must maintain a foothold in the legal camp. 
Law should not be given up to those who may be less sympathetic to its 
concerns.84 But this is not a call to give up on theory or to go easy on law.85 
Smart’s warning about the dangers of feminism being co-opted by the 
mainstream and being disempowered by dominant discourses are well made. 
A few examples from outside law should suffice. The trend for feminists to 
make political claims that are market orientated, rather than state centric, has 
been described by Squires and Kantola as leading to ‘market feminism’. 
Feminists often promote gender equality in the neo liberal language of 
efficiency and good business sense. This can shape feminist policies and 
practices, which may become concerned with supplying relevant technical 
knowledge rather than proposing new agendas.86 Fraser has also 
problematized the relationship between feminism and neo-liberalism. For her, 
second wave feminist critiques of the state have, unwittingly, been used by 
neo liberalism to advance its ideology.87 McRobbie also makes a similar point 
when she describes how elements of feminism have been absorbed into 	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  Vanessa Munro (n 12) 84	  
85 For a thoughtful discussion of legal feminism and theory see Anne Bottomley, ‘Theory is a 
Process not an End: A Feminist Approach to the Practice of Theory’ in Janice Richardson and 
Ralph Sandland, (eds), Feminist Perspectives on Law and Theory, (Cavendish 2000) 86	  Johanna Kantola and Judith Squires, ‘From State Feminism to Market Feminism’ (2012) 
International Political Science Review 1. The relationship between feminism and the state is 
complex and Kantola and Squires refer to the problem of feminists being co-opted by the 
state. They discuss the changing nature of the state and its relationship with the private 
sector. They see the market as opening up new opportunities for feminists, but their focus is 
on exploring the complexities and ambiguities of ‘market’ feminism.  87	  Nancy Fraser, Fortunes of Feminism, From State Managed Capitalism to Neoliberal Crisis, 
(Verso, 2013), According to Fraser feminist critiques of, inter alia, the family wage and welfare 
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mainstream institutions.  Feminist ideas appear in the media, popular culture 
and the state in the form of an individualistic neo liberal discourse using the 
language of empowerment and choice. This may lead to a disarticulation of 
feminism, as equality and freedom are regarded as having been achieved and 
feminism is seen as redundant. 88 
 
The danger of feminist disempowerment through engagement with 
mainstream institutions is real, and feminists must exercise caution. But this 
does not mean that feminists should refrain from using law. Smart’s warnings 
about law’s strength mean that feminists must try to effect changes in law’s 
methods and process as well as trying to improve the substantive law in 
particular areas such as rape and domestic violence. It is not sufficient just to 
expose law’s lack of impartiality and gendered nature.  Law as a set of ideas 
and practices should be opened up to other influences through the 
refashioning of old methods and the introduction of new ones.  
 
2.1 Harnessing Law’s Power 
The position adopted here is that legal feminism does have the power to 
impose its authority on law. Law is not impervious to feminist method.89  
Hunter observes that the feminist judgments project, which she along with 
others initiated, ‘flatly contradict –or attempt to contradict[s]...’this view. It 
endeavours to write women back into law by ‘harnessing’ legal methods.90 It 
sees law as porous and malleable rather than a closed system. In writing my 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88 Angela McRobbie (n 27) 10 and 27. But for a contrary view see Sylvia Walby, (n 26). See 
also the discussion above at 1.3 
89 Rosemary Hunter, ‘The Power of Feminist Judgments?’ (2012) Feminist Legal Studies 135 90	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judgment in Roberts v Hopwood 2010, as part of the feminist judgment 
project, I attempt to show that the legal techniques, and principles of judicial 
review themselves did not inevitably lead to a decision that was adverse to 
equality. There was nothing about legal method that dictated the outcome. 
Using the legal principles, norms and precedents, available at the time (1925), 
it was possible for judges to reach a conclusion that supported the local 
authority’s decision to provide equal pay for men and women, and to develop 
the common law to support equality. I also insisted on writing as a female 
judge (even though it would have been difficult for a woman to be appointed 
as a judge in the nineteen twenties) because of the view that judges bring 
their own experiences to the adjudicatory process depending on where they 
are situated.91  Feminists are better placed now, than when Smart wrote The 
Power of Law, to influence the course of the law. Twenty years ago there 
were few if any feminist judges.92 But since this time there have been 
examples of feminist judges able to apply law in alternative modes thus 
showing the potential for feminism to shape the law.93 
 
In Feminist Legal Theory 2013 I provide an overview of my approach to legal 
engagement. The chapter discusses the feminist analysis of two of 
liberalism’s key conceptual tools namely equality and the public/private 
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binary.94 It outlines the attempts by feminists to overcome the sterility of 
formal equality by the use of concepts such as mainstreaming and the 
equality duty that introduce more substantive notions of equality.95 It warns 
that the dismantling of the feminist architecture such as mainstreaming and 
the equality duty are retrograde steps that feminists should resist.96 The 
feminist critique of the public/private spheres is also re-examined in the 
context of more contemporary dilemmas such as the debate around forced 
marriage, and the divide in public law between public authorities subject to the 
HRA and those deemed to be private and outside its jurisdiction.97 The 
chapter finds that this analysis has been valuable in detecting the gendered 
nature of legal boundaries and at unmasking the law’s claim to objectivity. It 
then goes on to discuss how feminist legal methods can use this critique to 
avoid less gendered outcomes. It argues that there are occasions when using 
law is a risky strategy and that feminists need to desist. This is evident, for 
example, in the debate around the criminalization of forced marriage.98 I 
argue that feminists are sufficiently skilled to understand when legal remedies 
may be retrograde. But nevertheless law and its methods are too powerful to 
be left to their own devices but must be interrogated, challenged and moulded 
from within.  
 
Sexual harassment is particularly relevant to my analysis of the utility of law. It 
can be seen as a successful strategy where feminists identified conduct that 
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was previously regarded as harmless behaviour, and named it so that it was 
recognized as a form of sex discrimination.99 Sexual Harassment: A Defining 
Moment 2004 builds on my previous work in this area.100 It makes the case for 
both political and legal engagement in law by demonstrating that it was a 
combination of pressure within both institutions that determined the direction 
of travel towards more effective legislation.101 The article discusses the overly 
formalistic approach to equalities law adopted by the domestic courts. In 
addition there have been evidential difficulties establishing unwelcome 
behaviour, comparable to the problem of proving lack of consent in rape 
cases.102  It studies the unimaginative approach of the House of Lords in 
Pearce where the court upheld the refusal of a remedy to a lesbian teacher 
who suffered sex-based harassment by her students.103 It makes the point 
that there was no third party intervention in the case and no reference to 
alternative and more substantive notions of equality by the all male judges.104 
There was very little emphasis on doing justice to the claimant. This 	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anticipates themes in my later work that sees adjudication, particularly in 
human rights cases, as needing to be deliberative and participatory as a 
means of allowing fresh interpretations and insights to emerge. It also 
stresses the need to consider how alternative forms of legal reasoning based 
on feminist method can lead to more egalitarian outcomes.  
 
The article highlights the significance of the law reforms driven by political 
actors that resulted in the Equal Treatment Amendment Directive (ETAD).105  
Whilst feminist legal method is crucial in helping to mould judge made law and 
guiding judicial interpretation, it is obvious that there is often a need for well-
timed legislative intervention to clarify the law or to set it in a different 
direction. The ETAD provided a definition of sexual harassment obviating the 
need for a comparator, and establishing sexual harassment as a separate 
wrong, thus dealing with many of the weaknesses that had emerged in the 
case law. The Directive frames sexual harassment as an issue of substantive 
equality, and by referencing the key international human rights treaties 
reinforces the idea of women’s rights as human rights and draws strength 
from the various international treaties.106 The Directive was particularly 
welcome in the UK where the failure of the judges to take responsibility for 
applying the law in a more teleological manner meant that legislative 
intervention was necessary. However, as the article notes, without any 
understanding by the courts of the gender politics around sexual harassment 
the interpretation of the law may not result in the improvements sought; thus 
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feminist intervention in the adjudicatory and political processes will continue to 
be necessary.  
 
Sexual harassment, as a legal concept, has taken root within the law although 
its impact is uneven, and its application often flawed. The introduction of 
terms such as sexual harassment have not only named pre-existing wrongs, 
but have brought them into the public consciousness.107 Smart rightly draws 
attention to the need to evaluate legal strategies such as these. But this does 
not justify an overly timid approach. The problem with Smart’s work is that it 
can create a sense of disorientation that distracts legal feminists from 
deciding what they want from law, and how this can be achieved. Her thesis 
was never an outright rejection of law as she clearly states that some issues 
such as rape are already within the legal domain and therefore cannot be 
ignored.108 Invited to reflect on Feminism and the Power of Law some twenty 
years after its publication Smart explains that her motive for writing it was to 
provide a more critical perspective for her feminist inclined students who she 
felt were overly committed to campaigning for law reform. 109 She claims that 
her call to de-centre law was not a call to ignore law or a suggestion that 
feminists should not engage with it. She points out the irony of her current 
concern that feminists have been silent in areas that excited interest in the 
past.  She states that her strongest concern is that law should reflect the  
‘complex’ lived experiences of women’s lives.110 Despite what Smart may 
state, her work has generally been taken as a disincentive to engage with law. 
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This is evidenced by the fact that most UK feminist legal scholars who work 
within the legal frame, take seriously Smart’s anti law argument, and expend 
considerable energy justifying their decision to use the law. 111  In Feminist 
Activism and Third Party Interventions 2005 I point out that, although there is 
an element of speculation, Smart’s legal skepticism can be seen as one of the 
factors that has meant that feminist legal activism has been more contained 
than in North America, and has taken longer to emerge. This, of course, has 
to be viewed in conjunction with the absence of a bill of rights in the UK, 
before the introduction of the HRA, the historic lack of legal mechanisms and 
the problems of funding legal actions.112 However, it is suggested that the time 
has come to understand Smart’s work as discouraging the kind of proactive 
collaboration that is needed between feminist legal academics, activists and 
practitioners that is necessary to produce new and creative means of using 
law.  
 
Having explained why it is necessary for legal feminism to go beyond critique, 
and to actively work within the law it is necessary to consider what techniques 
might suitably be deployed. The next section considers the value of rights 
based strategies. It then discusses how feminist legal methods combined with 
a deliberative view of human rights can work within the adjudicatory process 
to produce more egalitarian outcomes. Feminism needs to change law from 
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within and legal feminists are well placed to do this. It is not just about law 
reform but about reworking and recasting feminist methods.  
 
3.00 Feminism and Rights  
Rights based activism has been a core part of campaigning for generations of 
feminists, and continues to be an important site of activity. A commitment to 
using, retaining and reconstructing rights, where necessary, is a theme 
running through my work. Rights are seen as a powerful tool of feminist 
politics. There is a focus in my publications on the use of both international 
and domestic rights and their interrelationship. But this commitment to rights 
is certainly not one that is shared by all feminist scholars, and there has been 
a steady stream of feminist scholarship critical of the rights based 
discourse.113 The first part of this section situates my human rights 
publications in the context of the feminist engagement, and critique of rights. It 
explains how feminists can influence the development of human rights 
through a deliberative approach that provides for the circulation of ideas 
between the global and the local. It adopts Benhabib’s iterative or 
jurisgenerative thesis, and considers how deliberative theories facilitate and 
justify the application by feminists of international human rights norms within 
the domestic legal sphere.114 The second part of this section shows how 
feminist legal method can be applied within the adjudicatory process in human 
rights cases. This advances feminist aims and also provides an opportunity 
for the law to produce a more nuanced version of the subject thus addressing 	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one of the most significant criticisms of human rights by feminists. In essence, 
there are two interlocking themes that are explored by my work. These are the 
benefits of human rights for feminism in the circulation of ideas, from the 
global to the local, and the use of the courtroom as a forum to influence and 
develop the application of rights.  
 
3.1 Feminist Critiques of Rights 
Traditionally feminists have used rights based language to make political and 
legal claims within the domestic sphere. Rights were, for example, the vehicle 
through which feminists have pressed claims from the right to be considered 
persons and to vote to the right to choose to have an abortion and to be free 
from violence.115 The language of human rights has also taken on increasing 
significance within the United Kingdom with the introduction of the HRA, which 
makes much of the European Convention on Human Rights (the Convention) 
enforceable in domestic law. During the 1990s global feminist activism 
culminated in a series of advances in the international sphere. This was part 
of a campaign to gain recognition that ‘women’s rights are human rights’.116  
Activists made use of the process of international norm setting in an attempt 
to include women within the human rights frame. It has led to the creation of a 
body of both hard and soft human rights law that promotes, inter alia, equality, 
reproductive autonomy and the freedom from violence. In particular, the 
campaign on Violence against Women (VAW) was regarded as pivotal. As 
Mertus states these provisions: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  115	  See	  Albie	  Sachs and Joan Hoff Wilson (n 52), Elizabeth Kingdom ibid 	  116	  See generally Charlotte Bunch, ‘Women’s Rights as Human Rights: Toward a Re Vision 
of Human Rights’ (1990) 12 Human Rights Quarterly 486 
	   36	  
 
‘…did not suddenly emerge from the minds of diplomats and magically 
flow from their pens. Rather, the unprecedented attention devoted to 
violence against women was the product of years of dedicated NGO 
advocacy at the domestic level, creative networking at international 
stages, wide-ranging leadership training institutes, revealing 
investigative reports, and on going educational campaigns.’ 117   
 
Through the strategies, noted by Mertus, women’s human rights have been at 
least acknowledged, if not realized, as part of the family of international 
human rights.118 This is not to over romanticize the process of norm creation 
in international forums. Boxi reminds us it is wise to be cautious about the real 
achievements that result from these declarations and treaties; NGOs’ sense 
of accomplishment is often disproportionate given the ultimate outcome.119  
Nevertheless, the international documents produced have been relied upon 
globally and locally to pressure states to adopt more effective laws and 
policies on violence against women. They also act as a platform from which 	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the effectiveness of enacted laws can be judged, and as a barometer for the 
need for future developments. 
 
The use of rights based strategies in both the domestic and international 
spheres has been the subject of extensive feminist scrutiny.120 The 
individualistic and ‘selfish’ nature of liberal conceptions of rights has been 
problematic. Much of this is bound up with liberalism’s concept of the subject, 
which is modeled on a particular version of the atomized and rational male. 
Naffine describes how law’s ideal subject is the ‘man of law’ who is the 
‘human protoype’ and is ‘free, mobile, able bodied and self sufficient’. 121 
It is argued that this fails to represent the experience of women whose lives, 
are traditionally centred around care giving (a responsibility that directly 
impinges on freedom, self sufficiency and mobility). Thus, it is claimed, 
women are far more relational in their thinking, and tend to stress the 
connectiveness between people.122 By contrast rights, particularly conceived 
of as trumps, encourage a type of competitiveness between individuals. This 
can lead to a multiplicity of conflicting claims that are of limited value in 
resolving disputes.123 It is argued that rights are too abstract, place the onus 
on the individual to take action and may be appropriated by the more 
powerful.124 They place too much emphasis on the role of the ‘neutral’ state 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  120	  For a general account of feminist critiques of human rights see Nicola Lacey, Feminist 
Legal Theory and the Rights of Women in Karen Knop (ed), Gender and Human Rights 
(Oxford University Press 2004) 13-54 and Siobhan Mullally (n 6) 121	  Ngaire Naffine, Law and the Sexes Explorations in Feminist Jurisprudence (n 59) 123 122	  Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women’s Development, (n   
17) and Robin West, ‘Jurisprudence and Gender’ (n 17)   123	  Carol Smart, The Power of Law (n 2) 155 and Elizabeth Kingdom (n 113)	  124	  See	  Nicola Lacey, Unspeakable Subjects: Feminist Essays in Legal and Social History (n 
73) 39. For an overview of the feminist critique on rights see Vanessa Munro (12) esp. ch. 3 
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and its institutions to vindicate rights.125 As a result other criticisms of rights 
are that they prioritize civil and political rights, and distract from the need for 
more radical ideologies of redistribution.126  
 
At the time of the introduction of the HRA in the UK McColgan famously 
warned about the threat to existing women’s rights.127 Her prediction, based 
on the Canadian experience, that the rape shield laws, campaigned for by 
feminists, would most likely be found to be inconsistent with Article 6 of the 
Convention proved to be prophetic. Shortly after the entry into force of the 
HRA the House of Lords used their strong interpretive powers, under section 
3 of the HRA, to read in words to the relevant statute to ensure that it was 
consistent with the Convention.128  This effectively undermined the legislative 
protection given to the complainant in a rape trial.129 McColgan’s critique of 
the HRA should also be seen in the broader context of the constitutional 
debate on human rights within the UK and the perceived shift in power from 
parliament to the judiciary.130  
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  Andrea Cornwall, ‘The Politics of Rights-Dilemmas for Feminist Praxis: an introduction’ 
(2006) Third World Quarterly, 1176,1185	  126	  Judy Fudge and	  Harry Glasbeek, ‘The Politics of Rights: A Politics with Little Class’ (1992) 
Social and Legal Studies 45. For a particularly thoughtful discussion of rights based strategies 
see Didi Herman, ‘The Good, the Bad and the Smugly: Perspectives on the Canadian Charter 
of Rights and Freedoms’ (1994) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 589 127	  Aileen McColgan, Women Under the Law: The False Promise of Human Rights, (n 2). For 
a less pessimistic view of the HRA see Susan Millns, ‘Bringing Rights Home: Feminism and 
the Human Rights Act 1998’ in Susan Millns and Noel Whitty (eds), Feminist Perspectives on 
Public Law (Cavendish 1999). See also Stephanie Palmer, ‘Feminism and the Promise of 
Human Rights: Possibilities and Paradoxes’ in Susan James and Stephanie Palmer (eds), 
Visible Women: Essays on Feminist Legal Theory and Political Philosophy (Hart 2002) 91-
116 128	  The relevant legislation was section 41 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 
1999. 129	  R v. A (No 2) [2001] UKHL 25. See the discussion of this decision in Feminist Activism 
and Third Party Interventions 2005 130	  See generally Danny Nicol, ‘Are Convention rights a no-go zone for Parliament?’ [2002] 
Public Law 438. See also Brice Dickson, Human Rights and the United Kingdom Supreme 
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The inclusion of women’s rights within the international human rights canon 
has also generated a related but distinct critique of rights discourse.131  As we 
have seen the flurry of activity, by feminist academics and activists in the 
eighties and nineties, saw international law as a new arena to challenge 
discrimination.132 However, by the turn of the millennium, feminist scholars 
began to express doubt about the impact of feminist activism in the 
international sphere, and whether it has made any real change. In particular, 
postmodern and post colonial feminists’ concerns included a fear that the 
universal human rights agenda is driven by the West, fails to reflect local 
priorities and does little to improve the lives of those who are the object of 
concern.133 This critique of human rights has been directed most often at 
feminist activism on Violence Against Women (VAW). Kapur acknowledges 
the successes of the VAW campaign, but she is critical of the portrayal of 
women as ‘victim subjects’ brutalized by their own ‘primitive’ culture.134 For 
her, insufficient account is taken of factors such as ethnic, religious and class 
differences.135  Interventions by campaigners invite comparisons with the 
‘civilised’ West bringing to mind imperial interventions in native cultures during 
the time of empire.136 Kapur also states that concentrating on VAW produces 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Court (Oxford University Press 2013) and the discussion on judicial deference in Judicial 
Deference and Feminist Method 2014  131	  Ratna Kapur (n 5) Diane Otto (n 5) Shereen Razak (n 5). For an account of the feminist 
critiques of international human rights law see Karen Engle, ‘International Human Rights and 
Feminisms: When Discourses Keep Meeting’ in Doris Buss and Ambreena Manji (eds), 
International Law: Modern Feminist Approaches, (Hart 2005) 132	  	  See Hilary Charlesworth and Christine Chinkin, The Boundaries of International Law: A 
Feminist Analysis, (Manchester University Press 2000)	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  See for example Ratna Kapur (n 5) Diane Otto (n 5) Shereen Razak (n 5) 
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136 See also Anne Orford, ‘Feminism, Imperialism and the Mission of International Law’ (2002) 
71 Nordic Journal of International Law, 275 
	   40	  
heavy-handed legal responses that are conservative and authoritarian; they 
are not motivated by improving women’s rights.137 Similarly, Otto observes 
that feminist campaigns on human rights carry an ‘imperial baggage’ and 
produce  ‘…a “native victim” subject in need of rescue and rehabilitation and 
re-privileges the figure, and the culture of the European woman as 
normative…’138 Both Kapur and Otto are calling attention to the possible 
hazards of using the language of human rights.  
 
3.2 Feminist Engagement with Human Rights  
Nevertheless, as I have pointed out in Feminizing Human Rights Adjudication 
2013, there is a body of feminist scholarship that engages with rights. Munro, 
for example, appears sympathetic to the use of rights. She argues that there 
is a distinction between being selfish and valuing the self.139  
Nussbaum, in her defence of liberalism, warns against abandoning its values 
and tools including rights arguing that they have the ability to challenge the 
law’s non interventionist stance in the private realm of home and family. She 
claims that liberalism has not been individualistic enough, and has failed to 
live up to its own standards in its treatment of women within the domestic 
sphere. Nussbaum’s argument that ‘…all human beings have a core of moral 
personhood that exerts claims on government…’ is a powerful statement 
indicating that rights still have the potential to dismantle gendered barriers.140 
Williams, from a critical race perspective, has also cautioned against the 	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  138	  Diane Otto, (n 5) 122.	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Human Rights: Women Make Demands and Ladies Get Protection’ (2004) 7 Health and 
Human rights 17 139	  Vanessa Munro (n 12) 79 140	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abandonment of rights noting that minorities who were previously deprived of 
rights often cherish them.141  The view taken here is that rights remain part of 
a dominant discourse, and for feminists to turn their back on rights risks 
exclusion from a key political and legal ideology. It would also further widen 
the gap between feminist scholarship and activism undermining the practical 
nature of the feminist project.  It is argued that the most convincing feminist 
scholarship engages with rights and attempts to reformulate and reconstruct 
them.142    
 
Human rights should be of interest to feminism because as sometimes 
political, moral and legal claims they create a space to progress feminist 
themes and ideas.143  Human rights can be concretised in law to provide 
practical remedies, but they always have an aspirational element that lends 
itself towards fresh modes of thinking providing the possibility for feminist 
interjection.144 My published works, to varying degrees, borrow from all of the 
schools of human rights, as identified by Dembour. She classifies human 
rights scholars into the following categories. 
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‘…“natural scholars” conceive of human rights as given; “deliberative 
scholars” as agreed; “protest scholars” as fought for; and “discourse 
scholars” as talked about’.’145   
 
These rather sketchy groupings convey the essence of some of the varying 
theories, and allow us to extrapolate the elements useful to the feminist 
scheme of rights put forward here. Feminism does not sit snugly within any 
particular school, and it is possible to find feminist scholars who fit into each 
category and some ideas will correspond with more than one.  
 
My writing respects and uses the discourse scholars to critique rights, but my 
perspective on human rights echoes many of the characteristics of the 
deliberative school. It does not see human rights as trumps.146 But it locates 
rights as part of a dialogic process where conclusions are reached based on a 
process of rational deliberation and justification in a variety of public forums. 
Deliberative scholars see human rights and democracy as interlocking. Rights 
are built into democracy rather than antagonistic to it.147 It presupposes that 
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there are certain agreed values that allow the dialogue to take place. But 
beyond this deliberative scholars disagree on the extent to which substantive 
values can inform the process.148 My own view is that although it is important 
to allow human rights to emerge as part of a dialogic process there is also a 
need, consistent with the view of the protest scholars, to see the purpose of 
human rights as being to remedy injustice and to consider the interests of the 
marginalized.149 This means that when formulating, interpreting and 
adjudicating on human rights political actors and judges have, at a minimum, 
to be mindful of this aim.150 
 
Deliberative theories emphasize the importance of forums where rational 
discourse can take place thus encouraging participation in the development 
and interpretation of rights. This stress on participation mirrors the priority of 
feminists. They have criticized the absence of women’s voices, when human 
rights were being formulated, with the consequence that they were sculpted in 
the image of men sidelining or ignoring women’s interest.151 In turn 
deliberative models have been critiqued by feminists for their universalism, 
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excessive proceduralism, emphasis on rationality and narrow view of the 
public sphere.152 But rather than reject them out of hand some scholars have 
recognized the potential of deliberative theories as providing tools for 
feminists to renegotiate and reconstruct rights.153 Deliberative theories, as 
shown below, provide a means for feminists to be part of a discursive 
progress through which rights circulate between international and national 
political and judicial processes. 
 
3.3 Feminism and Human Rights Iterations 
Feminists have mobilized at the international level with the aim of ensuring 
that women’s interests and concerns are part of the human rights canon. As 
discussed briefly above the burdens and benefits of this activity, and the 
extent to which it replicates earlier imperial agendas has cast doubt on the 
feminist project. Nevertheless, there is a now a well-established body of law 
and norms that have been produced as a result of this activism and that has 
been deployed as part of a progressive feminism within the domestic and 
international sphere. Benhabib has given one of the most persuasive 
accounts of this process. She understands the fear that human rights may 
lead to a ‘moral imperialism’ or may be instrumentalised for political ends’.154  
Her intervention is intended to provide a method of reconciling the universality 
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of human rights with a need to retain decision-making at the municipal level 
so that democratic legitimacy is retained. But rather than endorsing minimalist 
versions of human rights or Rawls’ ‘overlapping consensus’ she argues that 
human rights should be seen as part of an iterative process.155 Through these 
iterative re-statements of international norms domestic societies make them 
their own. They do this by applying them in the most context appropriate 
manner that retains the transcendent element of human rights while adapting 
them sufficiently to satisfy local democracy and culture. Iterations enables 
human rights norms to assume ‘flesh and blood’.156 
 
Other theorists such as Levitt and Merry have also explored the transmission 
and adaptation of human rights norms by what they have termed 
‘vernacularization’. 157Through their anthropological research they show how 
‘the global women’s rights package’ is ‘repackaged’ by domestic organizations 
to meld with local cultures and combined with other ‘discourses of social 
justice’.158 Levitt and Merrit characterize the relationship between human 
rights activists and legal actors as symbiotic.159 Social movements use the 
legal element of human rights to strengthen their work, but they may go 
beyond the law creating new meanings and claims. Legal activists focus more 
on building cases, appealing to UN agencies and on monitoring governments. 
However, the legal aspects of human rights strengthen social activists’ claims, 
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whilst legal activists need social movements to facilitate the implementation of 
human rights by generating public concern and putting pressure on 
governments.160 Vernacularization provides a helpful means to conceptualize 
the influence of human rights norms on local cultures. But Benhabib’s thesis 
of the iterative or jurisgenerative potential of human rights further explains 
how legal meanings in domestic law can be altered by the use of international 
human rights norms. Jurisgenerative is a term that was used by Cover, and 
refers to the process by which legal terms acquire meanings through 
interpretation. These interpretations rely on the ‘nomos’ or world of norms that 
is largely created by groups and communities.161  As adapted by Benhabib the 
jurisgenerative function of human rights moves away from the notion of 
international human rights as a ‘command’, but rather stresses its ability to act 
as a source of extra legal norms that can be used within the domestic 
sphere.162 This transmission of norms from the international to the local 
provides a useful conduit for feminist ideas that have been formed as part of 
international human rights law. They may be used to provide mechanisms or 
legitimacy for the adoption of new or the expansion of existing claims.  
 
The jurisgenerative or iterative process relies on a view of an independent 
civil society that is able to coalese around issues to effect change.  So, for 
example, when states ratify international treaties Benhabib observes that it  
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‘…give[s] rise to a public language of rights articulation and claims-
making for all sorts of civil society actors, who range from compliance-
monitoring NGOs to women’s groups, church groups, advocacy 
associations, and the like. This new language of public claims 
articulation circulates in the unofficial public sphere and can, and often 
does, impact further institutional reform and legislation.’163  
 
My thesis stresses the role of women’s groups and other civil society actors in 
pressing their claims through the political and legal systems, by lobbying in 
international and national fora, initiating litigation or intervening in cases, to 
ensure outcomes accordant with their aims. I see this as a positive strategy 
that allows feminist principles to act as a catalyst for change, and through the 
work of legal feminists, as influencing jurisprudential developments.164 
 
In Child Slavery in Hong Kong 2007 I re-consider the anti mui tsai campaign 
(1919-1938), and suggest that it can be seen as early human rights 
activism.165 The article recounts how the adoption of the vocabulary of the 
emerging international norms on slavery were used to protest against the mui 
tsai system, and to demand that the United Kingdom government live up to its 
promise to outlaw slavery and prevent trafficking. The work of the local 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  163	  Seyla Benhabib, ‘The Legitimacy of Human Rights' (n6) 100-101	  164	  The role of women’s groups in pressing claims is discussed in most of my works. There is 
an account of the legal activism of women’s groups in the UK in Feminist Activism and Third 
Party Interventions 2005 165	  The mui tsai system was practiced throughout China and much of South East Asia. Girls 
were sold, through a formal deed of gift by, usually poverty stricken, parents to work for 
another, wealthy, family as domestic servants. The girls were not paid wages, but when they 
reached maturity a marriage would be arranged. The custom was defended by the Chinese 
establishment as a form of philanthropy by wealthy families and as a means for poor families 
to secure the future of their daughters who might otherwise be abandoned. The view of those 
who opposed the mui tsai system was that it led to the trafficking in girls and often to 
prostitution and domestic abuse.	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activists created what Keck and Sikkink refer to as the “boomerang” effect. By 
feeding information to those on the outside, including international 
commissions from the League of Nations, they put pressure on their own 
government.166  The activists practiced “accountability politics” by holding 
governments to account for previously accepted standards and policies.167 
They also used the techniques of human rights organizations in their work by 
creating transnational networks.168 Local groups and activists worked with 
established and more experienced organizations such as the Anti-Slavery 
League.169 This led to a cross fertilization of ideas and information that gave 
the activists leverage over more powerful institutions and organizations. So for 
example, my research shows that, lobbying ensured that the definition of 
slavery in the Slavery Convention 1926 was interpreted by, the various 
League of Nations Committees on slavery and trafficking to include domestic 
slavery such as the mui tsai system.170 This meant that the League of Nations 
Slavery Committee was able to receive reports on the mui tsai despite 
objections from the Chinese delegation.171 The mui tsai were constructed 
either as slaves or as girls who were trafficked to fit within the jurisdiction of 
the slavery and trafficking committees.   
 
This episode provides an interesting early instance of the application of 
nascent international human rights in a domestic setting. Here the circulation 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  166	  Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders, (Cornell University Press 
1998) 24 167	  Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink (n) 12 168	  Child Slavery in Hong Kong 2007 374 169	  Child Slavery in Hong Kong 2007 373-375	  170	  Slavery Convention 1926 60 L.N.T.S. 253 171	  Child Slavery in Hong Kong 2007 372-373 
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of norms between the international and the local meant that the terms 
‘slavery’ and ‘equality’ were iterations that were received and refined by 
domestic and international civil society actors. They lobbied insistently for the 
mui tsai system to be re-interpreted as an abusive practice, and they 
pressured the government to take responsibility. This is not to ignore the 
colonial overtones of the campaign or the problematic classification of the mui 
tsai system as slavery.172 But it is to draw attention to an aspect of the 
incident often ignored by other scholars, and deepens understanding of the 
effectiveness of trans global mobilization in effecting change. 
 
More contemporary examples of the migration of international human rights 
norms from the international to the domestic sphere are analyzed in both 
Women, Culture and Human Rights 2010 and Feminist Legal Theory 2013. In 
these pieces I discuss and give examples of how international human rights 
norms have been used by domestic courts in the UK to progress feminist 
claims on violence against women. In the feminist judgment in Roberts v 
Hopwood 2010 I rely on the principle of equality between the sexes that had 
begun to develop in international law in the early twentieth century.173  I 
demonstrate how the council’s action, to introduce a policy of equal pay 
between the sexes, might have been legitimized by emerging principles of 
international law. In the United Kingdom courts the reliance on international 
human rights law sources to bolster the validity of a particular interpretation of 
legislation has been particularly noticeable in the judgments of Lady Hale. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  172	  Child Slavery in Hong Kong 377-379	  173	  Article 388 and Article 427 Treaty of Versailles 1919. These provisions created the 
International Labour Organisation and established the principle of equal pay between men 
and women. 
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She has consistently used international human rights law to justify decisions 
that reinforce human rights.174 This underlines the benefit of the presence of 
powerful domestic actors, who are open to the use of international norms, if 
they are to be adopted locally. 
 
The influence of international human rights law can be seen in the House of 
Lords’ decision in Fornah which is discussed in Women, Culture and Human 
Rights 2010.175 Here the House of Lords decided that a woman who left her 
own country, because she feared being made to undergo female genital 
mutilation (FGM), was entitled to refugee status even though the Refugee 
Convention does not include sex as one of the grounds of persecution.176 The 
chapter examines how the court’s reliance on international human rights law, 
campaigned for by feminists, legitimated the court’s decision and allowed it to 
interpret the Refugee Convention to include a gender-based harm.177 I also 
point out that framing FGM as a human rights issue meant that the court could 
conceptualise FGM as a matter of equality. This had the advantage that the 
court was able to de-exoticise FGM. It is seen as a part of an international 
pattern of violence against women that is an obstacle in the path of attaining 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  174	  Lady Hale has commented on the importance of international law and the role of 
intervenors in bringing developments to the courts’ attention. See Lady Hale, ‘Who Guards 
the Guardians’ 14th October 2013 (paper given at the Public Law Project Conference  
http://www.supremecourt.gov.uk/docs/speech-131014.pdf 
 (last accessed 15th January 2014) 175	  Fornah v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2006] UKHL.	  The court held that 
uninitiated women from Sierra Leone formed part of a social group, and if they left Sierra 
Leone because they feared female genital mutilation then they should be granted refugee 
status. 176	  Article 1A(2) Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 28 July 1951, United 
Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 189 as amended by the 1967 Protocol 177	  For an account of feminist campaigning on asylum and immigration in the UK see Susan 
Millns and Charlotte Skeet (n 35) 178 
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substantive equality. This is preferable to the more parochial approach of 
making a comparison with UK national law. 178 
 
The jurisgenerative impact of international human rights law is apparent in the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Yemshaw v London Borough of Hounslow, which 
I discuss in Feminist Legal Theory 2010. 179 As in Fornah the court looked to 
the global norms on violence against women to validate its interpretation of 
the law. In this case it was the term ‘violence’ in section 177(1) of the Housing 
Act 1996 that was under consideration. Relying on international law definitions 
the Supreme Court held that violence went beyond physical conduct and 
included other forms of behavior such as psychological abuse.180 The 
Women’s Aid Federation of England, through its third party intervention, 
brought to the attention of the court the nomos on domestic violence that had 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
178 Lady Hale states that ‘Hence, it is a human rights issue, not only because of the unequal 
treatment of men and women, but also because the procedure will almost inevitably amount 
either to torture or to other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment within the meaning, not 
only of article 3 of the Convention, but also of article 1 or 16 of the Convention against Torture 
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, article 7 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and article 37(a) of the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child.’ Fornah Ibid [para 94] (Lady Hale)  
179	  Yemshaw v London Borough of Hounslow [2011] UKSC 3. The claimant had left the 
family home claiming that she was scared of her husband’s threatening behavior although 
there had been no physical violence. As there was no physical violence the authority held that 
she could not be considered to have left her accommodation because of domestic or other 
violence in accordance with section 177 of the Housing Act 1986 and therefore was not 
considered homeless and entitled to accommodation.	  180	  Lady Hale gave the leading judgment. Her reasoning has attracted criticism for departing 
from a literal interpretation of the statute, and for her purposive approach to statutory 
interpretation. See Chris Bevan, ‘Interpreting Statutory Purpose-Lessons from Yemshaw v 
Hounslow London Borough Council’ (2013) 76 Modern Law Review 742 and Richard Ekins, 
‘Updating the meaning of Violence’ (2013) Law Quarterly Review 17. For more positive 
commentaries see Jonathan Herring, ‘The Meaning of Domestic Violence: Yemshaw v 
London Borough of Hounslow’ [2011]UKSC 3 (2011) Journal of Social Welfare and Family 
Law 297 and Susan M. Edwards, ‘Domestic Violence Not a Term of Abuse but a State of 
Consciousness’ (2011) 41 Family Law 1244 
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been developed in international law.181 This along with advances in national 
policy provided support for the court’s interpretation of the term ‘violence’. It 
enabled the judges to use a contemporary definition. This facilitated the 
claimant’s access to housing a vital remedy for victims of domestic violence if 
they are to be able to leave an abusive environment. 182 
 
Both of these cases demonstrate how international human rights’ precepts 
can broaden the meaning of existing domestic laws for the benefit of the 
vulnerable. There is an opening in the domestic law that is seized on by 
activists and lawyers who press for the interpretation of the law to better 
address a gendered harm. In both cases the court re-articulates a right that 
has already been adopted by the domestic law, thus not usurping sovereignty 
or being overly judicially active. But the court then extends the right in its 
definition of a refugee (Fornah) and of violence (Yemshaw) to offer greater 
human rights protection. The international law is deployed to articulate the 
most recent understandings of violence against women, and also expresses 
an aspirational vision of life as free from physical and psychological harm 
(Yemshaw), and from harmful non-consensual customs (Fornah).  
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  181	  The Women’s Aid Federation of England and the Secretary of State for Communities and 
Local Government intervened in the decision. The court noted that the definition of violence in 
General Recommendation 19 of the Convention on the Elimination of All forms of 
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and in the Declaration on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Violence Against Women 1993 include psychological or mental harm or suffering.  182	  The court also referred to the broader definition of domestic violence that had been 
adopted by a practice direction of the family court, Practice Direction (Residence and Contact 
Orders: Domestic Violence) (No 2) [2009] 1 WLR 251 and government guidance and policy 
documents on domestic violence. Yemshaw (n179) [paras 27-30] (Lady Hale) 
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3.4 Feminizing Human Rights and the Adjudicatory Process 
The potential of the HRA, as a means of progressing feminist ends, has been 
the subject of several of my publications. I see the HRA as providing fertile 
ground for feminist participation in the promotion and development of human 
rights. Finding points of pressure and influence within the law is crucial, if 
women’s interests are to be taken into account. Attempts to repeal the HRA or 
withdraw from the Convention should be resisted as acts that will close down 
the conversation on rights and reduce the scope for feminist influence.183 The 
weak system of judicial review, introduced by the HRA, allows the court to 
make a declaration that the law is incompatible with the Convention, but it 
does not permit the courts to invalidate legislation. It is for the executive and 
Parliament to decide whether or not to change the law.184  This is contrasted 
with a strong system of judicial review that permits the court to quash 
legislation.185  This weak form of judicial review produces an institutional 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  183	  For an account of this controversy see	  Helen Fenwick, ‘Conservative Anti-HRA Rhetoric, 
the Bill of Rights “Solution” and the Role of the Bill of Rights Commission’ in Roger 
Masterman and Ian Leigh, (eds) The United Kingdom’s Statutory Bill of Rights: Constitutional 
and Comparative Perspectives (Oxford University Press 2013) 309-342 184	  	  Sections 3 and 4 of the Human Rights Act. Young explains that the distinguishing feature 
of inter institutional democratic dialogue is that it is, ‘…a legal mechanism for the interaction 
between the judiciary and the legislature’. It is also different from dialogue as conversation, 
for example between the parties to a case or exchanges between judges, because it is more 
formal and is intended to provide for a resolution of a problem. It has the aim of protecting 
rights while respecting democracy. See Alison L. Young, Parliamentary Sovereignty and the 
Human Rights Act (Hart 2009) 117	  185	  There is a vibrant dispute between legal scholars on the legitimacy of judicial review of 
legislation in the human rights context. Waldron argues forcefully against judicial review of 
legislation by unelected judges arguing that it undermines democracy and the right to 
participate, which is the ‘right of rights’. See Jeremy Waldron, ‘A Rights Based Critique of 
Constitutional Rights’ (1993) 13 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 18 and Jeremy Waldron, 
Law and Disagreement (Oxford University Press 1999). For supporters of Waldron’s general 
view see Tom Campbell, Keith Ewing, and Adam Tomkins (eds), Skeptical Essays on Human 
Rights, (Oxford University Press 2001) and Keith Ewing, Bonfire of the Liberties (Oxford 
University Press 2010). For those who write in favour of judicial review of legislation see 
generally the groundbreaking work of Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Harvard 
University Press 1978). For a rebuttal of Waldron’s thesis see Aileen Kavanagh, 
Constitutional Review under the UK Human Rights Act (Cambridge University Press 2009) 
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dialogue on human rights.186 It encourages both intra and inter institutional 
exchanges on rights.187 This creates a space for civil society actors, including 
feminists, to participate in the formal and informal conversations it generates. 
The constitutional structure of the HRA means that feminists must press their 
claim within various institutions rather than relying exclusively on the courts or 
Parliament neither of which can be described as providing full representation 
for women.188  This description of the dialogic process under the HRA may 
seem a tad chimeric, to some, given the criticisms that has been made of the 
quality of dialogue between the courts and Parliament.189 But nevertheless the 
HRA has meant that rights claims can be made directly in the UK courts 
creating the chance for judges to consider the rights implications in cases 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  186	  There is also a dialogue between the United Kingdom courts and the European Court of 
Human Rights. See generally Merris Amos, ‘The dialogue between United Kingdom courts 
and the European Court of Human Rights’ (2012) International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly 557	  187	  Section 4 of the HRA permits the court to make a declaration of incompatibility stating that 
the law conflicts with the Convention. But it is ultimately up to Parliament to decide whether 
the law should be changed. This is described as a weak form of judicial review. This is 
contrasted with strong forms of judicial review that allow the court to invalidate legislation. 
Weak forms of judicial review are often described as dialogic because they lead to an 
exchange between the court and other institutions of government on human rights.  However, 
some critics have argued that in fact weak forms of judicial review do not lead to real dialogue 
as in practice the legislature will accept the court’s ruling. See Aileen Kavanagh, 
Constitutional Review under the UK Human Rights Act (n 185). For a general discussion of 
weak forms of judicial review see Mark Tushnet, ‘New-Forms of Judicial Review and the 
Persistence of Rights-And Democracy Based Worries’ (38) Wake Forest Law Review 813. 
For a discussion of the interaction between the courts and parliament under the Human 
Rights Act see Danny Nicol, ‘Law and Politics after the Human Rights Act’ [2006] Public Law 
272, Jeffrey Jowell, ‘Parliamentary Sovereignty under the New Constitutional Hypothesis’ 
[2006] Public Law 562, Alison L. Young, Parliamentary Sovereignty and the Human Rights 
Act (n 184) and Tom Hickman, Public Law after the Human Rights Act (Hart 2010). For two 
recent defences of dialogue, in the context of the HRA, see Aruna Sathanapally, Beyond 
Disagreement: Open Remedies in Human Rights Adjudication (Oxford University Press 2012) 
and Po Jen Yap, ‘Defending Dialogue’ [2013] Public Law 527. 	  189	  	  Gavin Phillipson, ‘The Human Rights Act, Dialogue and Constitutional Principles’ in 
Roger Masterman and Ian Leigh (eds), The United Kingdom’s Statutory Bill of Rights: 
Constitutional and Comparative Perspectives (n 183) 25-50, 39 and Colin R.G. Murray, ‘The 
Continuation of Politics, by other Means: Judicial Dialogue under the Human Rights Act 1998’ 
in Roger Masterman and Ian Leigh (eds), The United Kingdom’s Statutory Bill of Rights: 
Constitutional and Comparative Perspectives Ibid. See also the debate between Danny Nicol, 
‘Law and Politics after the Human Rights Act’ Ibid and Tom Hickman. ‘The Courts and Politics 
after the Human Rights Act: A Comment ‘[2008] Public Law 84 and generally n 183 above. 
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concerned with gender. Judges can tackle rights claims head on without 
having the final word. The HRA scheme ensures that feminist energies are 
not only directed at the legal sphere, but also at the various sites in the 
political sphere thus increasing the opportunity to engage.190  
 
My publications on human rights consider how, in this context, feminists can 
work within the HRA. I argue that the key adjudicatory tools of human rights, 
namely proportionality and deference, can be interpreted and applied in 
accordance with feminist method. Feminist methods encompass a set of 
techniques that include ‘asking the woman question’.191 This is to uncover the 
gendered meaning of law but also extends to rooting out other hidden 
interests based on race, class or other categories. It emphasizes practical 
rather than abstract reasoning that tries to do justice to the parties before the 
court.192 It further imposes a responsibility on the court to safeguard the 
interests of the disadvantaged.193  I refer to the judgments of Lady Hale to 
illustrate that feminist techniques can be feasibly used by judges within the 
existing legal paradigm. I also discuss the use of third party interventions, 
which can provide ‘social framework information’ and experiential 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  190	  For a discussion of whether feminists should progress claims through the courts or lobby 
for legislative or policy changes in the political sphere see Tsvi Kahana and Rachel 
Stephenson, ‘The Promise of Democratic Constitutionalism: Women, Constitutional Dialogue, 
and the Internet’ in Beverley Baines, Daphne Barak-Erez and Tsvi Kahana (eds), Feminist 
Constitutionalism: Global Perspectives, (Cambridge University Press 2012) 240-259.  191	  Katherine T. Bartlett, ‘Feminist Legal Methods’  (1990) 103 Harvard Law Review, 829	  192	  Katherine T. Bartlett Ibid, Rosemary Hunter, “An Account of Feminist judging” in 
Rosemary Hunter, Clare McGlynn and Erica Rackley (n9) 30-43, Martha Minow, ‘Justice 
Engendered’ in Patricia Smith (ed), Feminist Jurisprudence, (Oxford University Press 1993), 
217-243 and Patricia Smith, ‘On Adjudication: Patriarchy, Neutrality and Judicial Reasoning’ 
in Patricia Smith (ed), Feminist Jurisprudence, (Oxford University Press 1993) 210-215 193	  Ruth Colker, ‘Section 1, Contextuality, and the Anti-Disadvantage Principle’ (1992) 42 
University of Toronto Law Journal 77 
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perspectives to the court.194 They allow the court to make a decision fully 
aware of the consequences. It also provides the chance to persuade the court 
to adopt feminist interpretations of the law, and may, on some occasions, be a 
means of ensuring that the judiciary do not undo gains made by feminists.  
 
I see the courtroom as a site of deliberation that should be accessed by 
feminists to press their claims. In Feminizing Human Rights Adjudication 2013 
I rely on the work of Fredman and Kavanagh both of who defend the role of 
courts in upholding rights, and reject the argument that courts usurp the role 
of other branches of government.195 Fredman, drawing on deliberative 
theories argues that courts are reinforcing democracy when they are 
adjudicating on rights, and should apply the values of accountability, 
participation and equality.196 Similarly Kavanagh points out the benefits of the 
judicial process in upholding rights, which include providing a channel for 
those written out of the democratic system, and of protecting rights that are 
necessary for a functioning democracy.197  
 
To facilitate access to the court there is a need for legal aid, generous rules of 
standing and the use of plain language.198 This is to swim against the current 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  194	  Feminist Activism and Third Party Interventions 2005. The term ‘social framework’ 
information is borrowed from Rosemary Hunter, ‘An Account of Feminist Judging’ in 
Rosemary Hunter, Clare McGlynn and Erika Rackley, Feminist Judgments, From Theory to 
Practice (n 9) 37	  195	  Aileen Kavanagh (n 183) Sandra Fredman, Human Rights Transformed: Positive Rights 
and positive duties (Oxford University Press 2008) 196	  Sandra Fredman, Human Rights Transformed ibid103	  197	  Aileen Kavanagh	  (n 183) 379  198	  Sandra Fredman, Human Rights Transformed (n 195) 107 
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political tide in the United Kingdom.199 But this is all the more reason for legal 
feminists to stress the value of these principles, and to resist the narrowing of 
rules of standing, attempts to curtail third party interventions and the reduction 
of legal aid.200 There is also a need to see the court as having a distinct role to 
that of the legislature, in the enforcement of rights, and not simply replicating 
political debate.201 The adjudicatory process is another public forum, but one 
with different institutional mechanisms that is able to apply human rights 
values within the distinct context of an ongoing dispute. This has its limitations 
but it also means the courts examine human rights in different circumstances 
to Parliament and are able to highlight when the burden of a law or policy is 
disproportionate.202 For example in my examination of the House of Lords’ 
case of Kehoe in Feminizing Human Rights Adjudication 2013 I argue that the 
court should have made a declaration of incompatibility under section 4 of the 
HRA. This would draw attention to the burden imposed by the legislation on 
the claimant, a single mother, in not being able to access the courts to pursue 
her maintenance claim. It would have left the ultimate decision on changing 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  199	  At the present time the government is considering narrowing the rules of standing in 
judicial review cases to prevent the courts being used as a forum for political campaigning. 
There are no plans to change the victim test in human rights cases. The government is also 
consulting on	  imposing costs on third party intervenors where the intervention has increased 
the cost to the parties in the case. See Ministry of Justice, Judicial Review: Proposals for 
Further Reform, September 2013, Cm 8703. For a critical response to these proposals see 
The Bingham Centre for the Rule of Law, Response to Ministry of Justice Consultation Paper 
CM 8703, 1st November 2013 (available at 
http://publiclawforeveryone.wordpress.com/2013/11/01/bingham-centre-response-to-latest-
judicial-review-proposals/ last accessed January 10th 2014)  200	  For the changes to legal aid see the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders 
Act 2012. For the proposals to further restrict legal aid see Ministry of Justice, Transforming 
Legal Aid: Next Steps, September 2013, (CP14/2013).  201	  See Aileen Kavanagh (n 183)  202	  Sandra Fredman, Human Rights Transformed (n) 123	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the law to parliament, but it would have been a means of putting this issue on 
the political agenda.203 
 
The argument that human rights adjudication and dialogic structures politicize 
the court overestimates the degree to which courts are politically neutral and 
impartial.  Feminist legal scholars have stressed that judicial decision-making 
is value laden, and that the degree of choice judges have when applying legal 
principles should not be underestimated. This is not to argue that judges have 
carte blanche when deciding cases, but that legal methods often provide 
judges with a high degree of flexibility. 204 
 
In Women, Culture and Human Rights 2010 I suggest that feminists should 
consider how the proportionality principle might be developed to accord with 
feminist values. In Feminizing Human Rights Adjudication 2013 I take this 
idea further and explain, using examples from the case law, how feminist 
methods might be applied to the proportionality test so as to enable relational 
and interactive decisions to emerge in human rights cases.205 The 
proportionality test is usually applied when the court is considering whether a 
limitation on a right is justified, and requires rights and interests, to be 
balanced against each other.206 It forces the court to contextualize universal 
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  R (Kehoe) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2006] 1 AC 42. See the 
discussion in Feminizing Human Rights Adjudication 2013 204	  This is the premise that underlies the Feminist Judgment Project. See Rosemary Hunter, 
Clare McGlynn and Erica Rackley, Feminist Judgments: From Theory to Practice (n) 5 205	  The cases discussed include Campbell v MGN [2004] 2 AC 457, Re P (Adoption: 
Unmarried Couple) [2009] 1 AC 173 and Kehoe 206	  For the leading cases see de Freitas v Permanent Secretary of Ministry of Agriculture, 
Fisheries, Lands and Housing and Others [1999] 1 AC 69, R v Daly [2001] 2 WLR 1622 and 
Huang v. Secretary of State for the Home Department and Kashmiri v Secretary of State for 
the Home Department ([2007] UKHL 11.  
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precepts and ensures that rights are applied in a less individualistic and 
abstract manner.207 Rights are not seen as trumps but must be interpreted 
and applied in accordance with other interests including those of the 
community. I argue that this resonates with ethic of care theories that stress 
that individuals should be seen as situated within networks of relationships 
rather than as isolated actors.208 It directs attention to relational obligations, 
and to power structures in interpreting and applying rights, an approach that 
lends itself to a more realistic recognition of women’s lives. 
 
The proportionality test provides for greater scrutiny of decisions and of 
legislation by demanding that decisions and laws are explained and justified in 
accordance with human rights precepts. This transparency means that the 
gendered assumptions that underpin rights are more likely to be exposed.209 
When the court applies the minimal impairment test or balances rights overall 
it is likely to consider alternative legislative or administrative possibilities. This 
provides an opening for the parties and others, such as third party 
intervenors, to give the court the benefit of their knowledge and expertise, and 
to enter into a dialogue with the court thus making the interpretation and 
application of rights more participative.210 I analyze the case of Kehoe and 
show how a more structured application of the proportionality test, by Lady 	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the key writing include Robert Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Rights, (Oxford University 
Press 2002), Tom Hickman, ‘The substance and structure of proportionality’ [2008] Public 
Law 694, Julian Rivers, ‘Proportionality and variable Intensity of review’ (2006) 65 Cambridge 
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Beatty, The Ultimate Rule of Law, (Oxford University Press 2003) 
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Hale in her dissenting judgment, would have made it easier for her to act 
more boldly and grant a declaration of incompatibility.211  
 
In Women, Culture and Human Rights 2010 and in Feminizing Human Rights 
Adjudication 2013 I argue that when the court is using the proportionality test 
to balance the rights of groups and individuals to decide whether a restriction 
on a right is justified, it has to have regard to the needs and interests of the 
subject as well as the community. This creates the possibility of constructing a 
less essentialised, more relational and nuanced subject. This goes some way 
towards addressing the feminist criticism of the individualistic nature of rights. 
But reconstructing the subject is not an easy task. This is shown by my 
discussion of Lady Hale’s attempt to grapple with the issues of culture, 
religion and human rights in R (SB) v Governors of Denbigh High School.212  
Lady Hale balances the claimant’s Article 9 right to manifest her religion, by 
wearing the religious dress of her choice, against the schools desire to adopt 
a strict uniform policy to achieve harmony and equality between students. She 
uses feminist legal methods by attempting to seek out the interests of all 
concerned. She enters into a dialogue with the dissenting judge in the 
European Court of Human Rights in the case of Sahin and refers to the 
feminist literature.213 She sees the claimant as an individual with agency and 
challenges gendered attitudes of consent to religious attire. Lady Hale’s 
judgment may be flawed, but she does use the proportionality frame to ask 
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the right questions and to try to create a more grounded and less 
essentialised subject.214 
 
Judicial Deference and Feminist Method 2014 is also premised on the utility of 
rights as applied in accordance with feminist techniques. It discusses how 
deference in human rights cases might be exercised in accordance with 
feminist method. It builds on the themes of earlier articles of trying to embed 
feminist principles within the legal frame. Deference occurs when the court 
‘exceptionally out of respect for other branches of government and in 
recognition of their democratic decision making role, declines to make its own 
independent judgment on a particular issue’.215The exercise of deference may 
lead to areas of law being off limits to the court, and may well be the reason 
why it refuses to uphold a right denying justice to the individuals before the 
court.216 The article looks at the existing theories of judicial deference, and 
how they might fit with feminist legal method.217 It is argued that the courts’ 
discretionary exercise of deference to other institutions of government or to a 
public authority could benefit from adopting feminist legal techniques. This 
would include avoiding rigid categorization, greater reflexivity and a concern 
for the disadvantaged. Reflexive judging requires judges to consider not just 
their own sources of knowledge and experience, when deciding whether to 
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defer, but also needs them to be attentive to other perspectives. Again I stress 
the significance of courts being open to social framework material and real life 
experiences through third party interventions. I also explain how the rigid 
distinction between the private and the public led to women’s experiences 
being excluded from law. This history means that feminists are wary of 
categorizations such as positive and negative obligations and that between 
law and policy. I argue that the underlying values of these distinctions should 
be interrogated and made explicit. I use the leading judgment in Quila, a case 
concerned with forced marriage, to show how the majority of the Supreme 
Court avoided deferring by refusing to decide the case on the basis of 
whether the obligation was positive or negative or to classify issues as one of 
policy.218 
 
A cluster of Supreme Court decisions, involving the right to family life in Article 
8 of the Convention, are discussed to demonstrate how the method the courts 
used in a series of immigration cases, where they refused to be overly 
deferential to the executive, can be understood as an example of feminist 
method. In these decisions, mainly concerned with the splitting up of families 
through immigration law, the courts have insisted that the cases are decided 
on their facts. They have sought out the hidden interests of children, and 
grounded their decision in the practicality and relational nature of family life.219 
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These cases are significant because they show that legal methods can 
capacitate a form of judging that is less abstract and takes account of the 
interests of the marginalized.  It is important to highlight these decisions to 
show that different forms of judging are possible, and that it is worthwhile for 
feminists to press for these methods to become more routinely used in the 
adjudicatory process. 
 
To sum up, engaging with rights should not only take the form of initiating 
litigation or intervening in cases. It extends to persuading judges to reflect on 
the modalities of judging, and to try to embed feminist techniques within the 
legal process to make them mainstream. My method of examining key legal 
tools, such as proportionality and deference, and exploring how they might be 
applied in accordance with feminist techniques shows that legal methods are 
open to feminist influence, and that there is evidence from the case law that 
these methods can take root.  
 
4.00 Conclusion 
Feminists have consistently challenged law’s neutrality, and its exclusion of 
women’s interests. Law has sometimes failed to live up to feminist 
expectations frustrating attempts to make it more sensitive to lived realities. 
For many scholars this is evidence of law’s intransigence, and is reason to 
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turn away from law to seek alternative means of advancing feminist aims.  
This has widened the gap between scholarship and activism, and has the 
disadvantage of reducing feminism’s influence on law. Law’s reluctance to 
address feminism’s critical appraisal is not a reason to absolve law from its 
responsibility to provide an inclusive form of justice. The various examples 
presented show how law has, on occasion, been willing to acknowledge 
gendered harms, such as sexual harassment, female genital mutilation and 
domestic violence, even if they have been clumsily dealt with and the gains 
made are halting and incremental. The question for legal feminists is how to 
make law more responsive to women’s interests and needs? My thesis 
argues that there are opportunities for feminist principles to make an impact. 
The use of strategic litigation, third party interventions, reliance on human 
rights and persuading judges to use feminist methods can all contribute 
towards making law more receptive.  
 
Feminism, if it is to remain relevant, must, consistent with its history, continue 
to draw on ideas that come from the ground up, and which are rooted in 
people’s lives. The deployment of the universal values of international human 
rights, that speaks to these needs, can have a decisive outcome in domestic 
courts as the decisions in Yemshaw and Fornah demonstrate. The dynamic 
flow of ideas between the local and the global, stimulated by feminist activism, 
has a positive impact on the practice of law. Similarly, the spaces created by 
the formal and informal structure of the HRA are also useful to feminists 
allowing for the circulation of norms and providing for the possibility of 
conversations and exchanges with interested parties, and multiple political 
and legal institutions. My writing has explained the advantages of working 
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within law’s parameters by drawing on its existing tools. All of the publications 
presented have contributed to this thesis in their different but integrated ways.  
My work shows how feminist values have made their mark on law, and can 
continue to do so, by appropriating legal concepts and revitalizing them to 
achieve feminist ends. This pragmatic predilection for law and human rights 
needs to be combined with the feminist capacity to think imaginatively, to 
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